This changed after the TALPA proposal for Operational Landing Distance (OLD). The idea is that a reference based on time rather than distance is more realistic.

Check these references for more info:

http://www.ukfsc.co.uk/files/Safety%20Briefings%20_%20Presentations/Airbus%20Safety%20First%20Mag%20-%20August%202010.pdf

https://www.faa.gov/documentlibrary/media/advisory_circular/ac_25-32.pdf

There was indeed some confusion after the AD and the AMOC. Mostly due to excessive wording in both of them to say something quite simple. 

The AD allows for flaps to be retracted if leaving them out increases the risk during taxi. An inspection by maintenance is required either way. 

The AMOC identifies the weather conditions where an inspection is required, directs the crew to do the normal after landing procedure and notify maintenance that an inspection is required. 

The wording between the two when describing conditions differ slightly but the meaning is next to identical. 

And the outcome of both the AD and AMOC is, if I’m not totally mistaken, also identical: flaps can be retracted after landing, and maintenance needs to be informed by means of a tech log entry. 

Retracting to flaps 20 could be a pretty good idea. However, since the original bulletin text says “The probability of this occurring is considered to be extremely remote” and since we normally rarely have flaps in takeoff position on tight parking gates with ground vehicles in close proximity... maybe it’s best to fully retract? I don’t know. 

I'd say that's the best 787 home simulator at the moment. I even wrote a blog post about it!

Check the section about Alternate Ventilation. The -8 has a dedicated valve, but the -9 and -10 use the outflow valves instead. In this situation, the aft outflow valve moves to the one o’ clock position. 

Thanks for the feedback. It seems the ACM freezing issue has been resolved with a software update some time ago. I’ve updated the EICAS entry in the app

Yes. But only for engine anti-ice. Pressurization is achieve with electric air compressors (CACs)

The APU has no bleed system.

The 787 doesn’t have any hydrophobic coating and the fluid is just a simple alcohol based type

I think that’s a valid concern. I would only use it together with lots of regular rain, unless it was absolutely necessary to clean the windshield for some reason. In that case, use a lot before starting the wiper. 

It has three autopilots. All three are required for CAT IIIB fail-operational autolands. Two are required for CATIIIA fail-passive autolands.

This is a commonly seen message, especially in oceanic operations whenever you have slightly poor satellite coverage. The system usually correct this by itself, but sometimes you get stuck with it for a long time and then you might wanna try to correct it. Check the Data Communications chapter in the 787 Guide app which has a section on troubleshooting.

The VFSG on the 787 works like the APU starter generator on the 737. 

It’s used as a starter, and once the engine is running it’s used as a generator. Unlike other aircraft, the frequency varies with the engine speed and is instead stabilized by solid state circuitry. 

With no engine generators operating, one APU generator get connected above 25,000 feet, and both of them only below 25,000 feet. Unfortunately, I don’t know the reason behind this design decision.

The checklist used to have a note: "This minimizes extinguisher agent leakage out of the compartment." but it was removed in a QRH update with the following explanation: "Deleted the reason for the step to set the landing altitude. The reason for setting landing altitude to 8000 is more complex than just reducing leakage out of the compartment. This information is deleted from the checklist to be common with other airplane models. The complete reason is more complicated and long, including flight test certification results, oxygen reduction in the cargo compartment, and increases in Halon concentration.”

This is question doesn’t have a simple answer, unfortunately. We used to run this scenario in the simulator a few years back, and every crew would come to a different decision. There are so many factors. Is the fire warning still active? (if yes, then maybe lean towards evacuation) Is there a smell of smoke in the cabin? Are you transporting DG? Does the fire and rescue services have infrared cameras that can sense increased heat in the cargo compartment? The key is to collect as much information as possible, but also not waste time. 

Check the Fire and Smoke chapter in the app. Since you potentially can’t stop the source of the smoke here, you wanna set up the outflow valves in such a way that smoke is kept to one section of the cabin. The system is then left that way for the remainder of the flight to control the smoke situation until you’re on the ground. Obviously “remainder of the flight” here would ideally be less than 15 minutes… since you have an uncontrollable smoke situation.

This checklist attempts to troubleshoot and isolate where the smoke comes from. Since packs are one of the usual suspects when it comes to smoke in the cabin, you turn them off and wait for a while, one at a time, to see if the smoke clears. If it does, then it’s likely that pack was the culprit.

Yes, in secondary/direct it’s like flying a 737... you have to trim when you change thrust, select flaps, or gear

These gates are the same on the 777 and I believe also 757/767. The flap 1 gate is there to protect the slats from being retracted past the middle position. While going past flaps 5 and ending up with flaps 1 on a single-engine go-around would be bad, it probably wouldn’t be as catastrophic as retracting the leading edge slats. Especially since flap 1 also gives you autogap protection if the AoA is too high. 

All three hydraulic systems must be set to ON to retract the flaps on the ground. Flaps are only powered by the center system, but spoilers powered by the left and right system must be lifted during flap retraction. A feature blocks retracting the flaps if not all system are on, to prevent spoiler damage.

AOA alone is not enough to calculate airspeed. 

Inertial data is needed to estimate an accurate lift coefficient from which the synthetic airspeed is derived

Personally, I declutter when I’m fully configured for landing, so around 1500 feet. 

"Autothrottle is engaged for takeoff, a derated thrust setting is selected, and the TMF calculated takeoff thrust limit is different than EEC calculated thrust limit value"

Each AOA vane deflection is measured by two resolvers, so there are four of these in total. Related status messages are AOA L1, L2, R1, and R2. 

As you can see on MEL 31-12-03-01, dispatch is allowed with two of those failed. This has no operational impact, the remaining resolvers provide AOA signals to all systems. 

For example, the flight controls Enhanced Stall Protection (ESP) function which limits maximum angle of attack at certain flight conditions requires at least 2 of 4 AOA resolvers to operate.  

However, in addition, the Air Data Reference Function (ADRF) computes a synthetic angle of attack using pitot air data, inertial data and information from other aircraft systems (flap setting, etc)

If two resolvers are already failed, followed by failure of a third resolver, what happens? Now the ADRF algorithms revert to using the remaining operative resolver, monitoring it with the synthetic AOA signal.  

The ESP function becomes disabled, annunciated by the EICAS advisory message STALL PROTECTION (this is a new message for the 787 which is not on the 777), but the normal stall protection, flight deck displays, and stick shakers all function normally.  

Finally, let’s assume dispatch with two resolvers failed on one side, and then in flight the opposite vane breaks or loses heating. In this case the ADRF relies completely on the synthetic AOA signal. The ESP is disabled (STALL PROTECTION message) but again, normal stall protection, flight deck displays, and stick shakers is still available. The precision is probably slightly reduced, but the flight crew can still rely on these systems.

I don’t have a definitive answer why the fuel balance system is inhibited on the ground with engines running. However, this system opens the defuel valve to let fuel into the refuel lines, so my theory is that the designers (or regulators) did not want this for takeoff. Perhaps because part of the fuel pump outflow is lost into these lines the risk of a flame out is increased. I’ve asked around a bit, but haven’t found a complete answer yet.

With the center pumps on, the fuel balance system wouldn’t balance the fuel. To balance fuel, the refuel manifold is used. When you activate the fuel balance system, the defuel isolation valve connects the engine fuel feed lines to the refuel/jettison lines. As you can imagine, if the high pressure center pumps were on, that fuel would be pushed into the refuel lines and the imbalance between the main tanks would never be settled.

It’s also worth noting that original reason for the new fuel balance on the 787 wasn’t for pilot convenience but due to new redundancy requirements. So the system is completely independent and separate from the cross feed.

I think that’s so that if the decision to stop is taken just prior to 80 knots for the less serious failures, you have 5 knots of reaction/action time to reject without getting the aggressive autobrake. If the RTO autobrake was activated right at 80 knots you’d probably get the hard braking if the first actions to stop were taken at .. say 79 knots. Makes sense?

Up to 80 knots you get the caution light for the ENG FAIL L,R caution message, but from 65 knots the Engine Failure Alert System takes over. And it works with the warning light all the way up to 6 knots prior to V1.